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Abstract—Location sharing applications are becoming increas-
ingly common. These applications allow users to share their
own locations and view contacts’ current locations on a map.
Location applications are commonly used by friends and family
members to view Global Positioning System (GPS) location of an
individual, but valuable forensic evidence may exist in this data
when stored locally on smartphones. This paper aims to discover
forensic artifacts from two popular third-party location sharing
applications on iOS and Android devices. Industry standard
mobile forensic suites are utilized to discover if any locally stored
data could be used to assist investigations reliant on knowing the
past location of a suspect. Security issues raised regarding the
artifacts found during our analysis is also discussed.
Index Terms—mobile forensics, mobile security, location ser-
vices, application analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile applications allowing the sharing and retrieval of
GPS location are now very common on the iOS App Store and
Google’s Play Store. These allow users of smartphones to grant
access to their location to others, providing for on-demand
GPS access. This is often sold as a safety application, such as
a parent ensuring their child makes it to school. Another use
is to allow convenience among friend groups when meeting
up at a location.
Because of the always-on nature of these applications,
valuable forensic data may exist on the local storage of devices
with them installed. This could be of use to law enforcement.
Some investigations rely on location-based evidence to cor-
roborate a story or track a suspect’s movements. There may
be cases where the suspect’s phone is not available, but one of
their accomplice’s devices is available. Even if the user logs
out of the application, location data may still be recoverable.
Previous forensics research has looked at general GPS artifact
locations on iOS and Android operating systems, as well as
native applications’ location tracking history [1]. However,
there is a lack of research on third-party location sharing
applications utilized by many families and friend groups.
The target devices for this study are one device using
iOS and one device using Android operating system (OS).
These OSs were chosen because of their large market share;
according to the International Data Corporation, Android has
85.0% of the global market, with iOS in second at 14.7% [2].
These two operating systems overwhelmingly represent the
smartphone market. They are also well-supported by forensic
tools and processes. Authors in [3] have documented methods
for third-party smartphone forensic acquisition, and authors in
[4] presented evaluation of privacy when forensically analyz-
ing an Android device.
The two applications chosen for this study are Life360 and
iSharing. These applications were chosen because of their
popularity on the market and their support for both operating
systems. As of January 2019, Life360 was the seventh most
popular application in the Social Networking category for iOS,
with iSharing as a top choice for GPS applications on Android.
Both applications support GPS tracking of friends and family,
and they both advertise historical viewing of location data.
The operation of location services on mobile devices is well-
understood by previous studies [5], [6]. Based on this research,
it is reasonable to assume GPS data could be found by a
forensic analysis tool.
In this paper, we demonstrated our forensic analysis on
analyzing aforementioned applications installed in both An-
droid and iOS devices. The acquisition process is explained
in detail with challenges faced. We presented the absence
or presence of GPS data as well as lists of users on the
applications, and GPS tiles. Moreover, the files acquired from
the devices are examined for completeness compared to the
populated data. The methods presented in this paper will assist
law enforcement in handling location-sensitive investigations
when the location sharing applications are found during the
investigation.
II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
Both iOS and Android devices utilize the GPS in order to
receive and transmit location data [6]. GPS was first developed
by the United States Department of Defense in 1978. There
are 24 main satellites orbiting the Earth which send radio
signals to the ground. GPS-enabled devices read data in order
to provide accurate location data [6]. By utilizing GPS data,
smartphones are able to provide services such as turn-by-turn
navigation and location tracking applications such as the ones
described in this study. Apple includes a first-party location
tracking application in iOS. Known as Find My Friends, this
application allows users to share and receive locations of other
users, similar to the applications analyzed in this present study.
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Third-party applications are downloaded from the App Store
on iOS and the Google Play store on Android. At the time of
this article’s writing, two of the most popular applications for
location sharing are iSharing and Life360. These applications
were chosen for their popularity, their advertised features
of location history, and their availability on both platforms.
Life360 currently has over 222,000 ratings on the App Store,
and it was featured as App of the Day on the store, being
sold as an application which promotes safety. Analyzing these
applications appears representative of the current most popular
location tracking applications available on the markets.
A. iOS
Previous research has shown the existence of GPS evidence
on iOS. In 2012, iOS received media attention for the existence
of a file which permanently stored a user’s location history
[1], which could be combined with mapping software to
display everywhere a user had been since purchasing their
phone. Apple later patched this behavior, claiming the file was
behaving abnormally and the intended behavior had been to
only store data for two weeks.
Location data on iOS is processed and received using the
CoreLocation framework. CoreLocation is a built in compo-
nent of the iOS Application Programming Interface (API),
available for developers to use when producing iOS applica-
tions. Many popular applications and services, such as Google
Maps, use this framework. iOS is able to use the “latitude,
longitude, and altitude of the user’s device, along with the
level of accuracy to which this information is known, and the
direction in which the device is moving [7].” CoreLocation
tracks this information using either the cellular network, the
WiFi network location, or GPS, and each one of these methods
is more accurate than the previous. Therefore, regardless of
positioning method, the location will be stored in one central
area. Both GPS and cellular data positioning use triangulation.
Triangulation connects to at least three GPS satellites or cell
towers and using the signal strength and positioning of each,
uses this to determine device location.
Another possible data source on iOS devices is the App
Caches folder [8]. Each application has its own set of cache
folders where it can store temporary data. This data can vary
greatly among each application, but it can contain valuable
forensic data. This is not typically found in a standard iTunes
backup. “Because the Caches folder is not contained within
an iOS standard iTunes backup, the mobile forensic solution
must use the house arrest and file relay services for recovery
and collection [8].” It is possible the Life360 and iSharing
cache folders contain cached data of users’ locations. Even if
coordinates are not found, discovery of map tiles could reveal
where other users have been in a more generalized area.
B. Android
Research has also been conducted on location forensics on
Android. Location based services provide for location tracking
on Android, which keep records on the user’s current and
previous locations [5]. Location based services on Android
also provide for notifications when users move in and out of
an area. GPS functionality is simple to enable in Android,
often requiring only a single XML file to configure. The
Android and iOS variants of iSharing and Life360 should
function identically, as GPS functionality is now common
and standard on both operating systems. Android is also
vulnerable to leaking GPS information without the user’s
knowledge. Common enterprise applications, including one
built into devices manufactured by HTC, were found to store
unencrypted GPS location [9]. These unencrypted files should
easily be found by modern forensic tools. Previous research
has also shown possible forensic artifact locations for Android
location data [10]. Android stores the latest cell towers and
WiFi routers in the system folder’s cache files. The web
browser stores GPS locations in CachedGeopositions.db. Third
party applications were also found to store GPS locations in
their database files. Twitter, for example, stored latitude and
longitude of status messages in a file labeled author id.db.
These coordinates were stored despite Twitter not being known
as a location sharing application. Android applications also
commonly contain cache folders, which should also be exam-
ined. Map tiles, GPS coordinates, and lists of affiliated users
are all potential artifacts which could be found in the Android
application’s folder.
C. Acquisition Methods
Multiple types of extractions can be used to produce a
forensic image of smartphones. A forensic image is a copy
of the data contained on the device. A forensic investigator
should aim to obtain the most complete record of data possible
while avoiding altering evidence. Cellebrite, a commonly used
mobile forensics tool vendor, described the two main types
of extraction - physical and logical [11]. A third form, file
system extraction, is a more thorough variant of a logical
extraction. The most complete type of acquisition is a physical
acquisition, which takes a bit-for-bit copy. It captures the en-
tirety of the device’s storage, including unallocated and slack
space. This provides for the possibility of recovering deleted
and hidden files. Physical acquisition, however, often requires
invasive and destructive methods such as JTAG to obtain [12].
Industry tools such as Cellebrite UFED Analyzer and Magnet
AXIOM can perform physical acquisitions on some older iOS
and Android devices and OS versions, but it is not typically
possible on newer versions of each operating system. Logical
extractions use the operating system’s built-in API to obtain
data [11]. While commonly obtainable, logical extractions are
limited to what the manufacturer makes available. However,
they can still contain a large amount of valuable data, and
sometimes are the only option for an acquisition. A file
system acquisition, commonly available for rooted Android
phones or jailbroken iOS devices, obtain the entire filesystem,
including internal system folders. This can result in additional
data being found. However, jailbreaking an iOS or rooting an
Android device is a process which changes the file system and
potentially alters the evidence. It is important to document why
this is necessary when performing an investigation. Rooting an
Android device consists of gaining full unrestricted access to
the file system of the device [13].
An additional option for an acquisition on iOS is analyzing
an iTunes backup file [14]. Most mobile forensic tools can
open and analyze backup files, which has been found to
contain some location-related files. For example, the “Map”
directory on an iOS device contains a history.plist file, which
lists GPS locations. While this study will have access to a full
device image, it is important to note investigators may rely on
the backup file if the device itself is unrecoverable.
Overall, the most complete method for obtaining an ac-
quisition on an iOS or Android device will be a physical
acquisition if possible, and a logical acquisition if not. The
iOS device will need to be jailbroken in order to achieve this
on modern iOS versions, and Android will require root to
be obtained. These methods give access to lower level system
functions [15], allowing more complete acquisitions. The latest
jailbreak available for iOS, known as Electra, supports iOS
versions up to 11.3.1 [16]. This iOS version was released on
April 24, 2018. No jailbreak currently exists for any variant
of iOS 12. Methods of obtaining root vary greatly by device
for Android. It will be most valuable to use the latest version
of the operating systems available for each of these methods.
In this section, we provided an overview of the literature
relevant to mobile phone acquisition and GPS data. Previ-
ous research has been performed on GPS applications, and
documented methods exist for obtaining a forensic image on
both iOS and Android. Multiple acquisitions, both physical
and logical, should be performed. The cache folders should be
examined for forensic evidence. The next section will outline
the specific methodology to be performed for both iOS and
Android.
III. METHODOLOGY
This study will follow a standard forensic model to acquire
and analyze images from the devices. Three devices were
utilized and chosen for this study - an iPhone 7 running iOS
12.0.1, an iPhone 5 running iOS 10.3.3, and a Samsung Galaxy
S7 running Android 8.0. The iPhone 7 and Galaxy S7 were
chosen to ensure the most recent software was analyzed for the
study. The iPhone 5 was utilized to ensure compatibility with
a jailbreak, as jailbreaking often discovers files and caches not
acquirable by other methods.
The tools used for acquisition and analysis in this study
include Cellebrite UFED 4PC 7.5.0.845 and Magnet AXIOM
2.6.0.11689. These are both standard forensic tools used
by large law enforcement agencies worldwide. Commercial
mobile forensic tools are often compared for effectiveness
by research, such as [17]. These tools are both capable of
performing all acquisition types of supported mobile devices.
The forensic workstation utilized for this study was a Dell
Optiplex 7060 running Windows 10 Education 64-bit Build
17134. The workstation had 16GB of RAM and utilized an
Intel Core i7-8700 CPU.
Two new iCloud accounts were created for this study, as
well as a new Gmail account. The iCloud accounts were used
to setup the iPhone devices as a new device. The Gmail
account was used to setup the Galaxy S7 device as a new
device. The devices were configured to factory default settings.
The only addition was configuring the WiFi networks used to
track location. The outline for the methodology is as follows:
• Wipe and restore all devices to factory defaults.
• Configure devices using empty iCloud and Gmail ac-
counts.
• Install latest version of iSharing and Life360.
• Perform a baseline logical acquisition of each device.
• Populate the devices with data.
• Allow each device to track locations for 72 hours.
• Perform a second logical acquisition.
• Jailbreak the iPhone 5.
• Root the Samsung Galaxy S7.
• Perform a full file system acquisition of the Galaxy S7
and iPhone 5.
• Analyze results in UFED Physical Analyzer and AXIOM
Examine.
A. Data Population
In accordance with National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) standards [18], each phone was populated
with sample data. The iSharing and Life360 applications
were installed on a personal device which was in frequent
location movement, an iPhone XS Max. Both applications
were also installed on each research device. Profiles were
populated with name, profile picture, and home locations. Each
application was populated with all other device as location
sharing contacts.
The devices were allowed to connect and track location data
for 72 hours. During this period of time, the chat and voice
call functions of each application were utilized. This simulates
how a typical user may use the application, and ensures a
sufficient amount of potential data exists. During this period
of time, GPS and WiFi functionality was enabled.
B. Analysis
Logical acquisitions were performed for the baseline
and first analysis acquisition. A logical acquisition was
chosen because it does not modify significant amount
of data on the device, and it is widely supported across
tools and devices. The application folders were identified
on each device, as these are of particular interest. On
Android, the file path for the iSharing application was
found to be /apps/com.isharing.isharing/db/crash reports.
The file path for Life360 was /sd-
card/Android/data/com.life360.android.safetymapd.
On iOS, the file path for iSharing was
/Applications/com.isharing.iSharing-Lite. The file path for
Life360 was Location’s /Applications/com.life360.safetymap.
These acquisitions were taken using both Cellebrite
UFED4PC and Magnet AXIOM. The backup method was
selected for Android. Once these acquisitions had been per-
formed and archived, the iPhone 5 was jailbroken using the
h3lix Jailbreak. This allows full filesystem access to the device.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF ARTIFACT AVAILABILITY
Android iOS
iSharing Life360 iSharing Life360
Contact Lists Yes No Yes Yes
User Information Yes No Yes No
User Password No No Yes No
User GPS Coordinates Yes No No Yes
Contact GPS Coordinates Yes No Yes No
Messages No Yes No No
The Galaxy S7 was rooted using Samsung’s ODIN tool. ODIN
is an internal application used to flash new firmware onto a
device [19]. Once the custom firmware was loaded, root access
was confirmed by browsing the phone’s filesystem.
Once these steps were complete, physical acquisitions were
attempted for each device. The iPhone failed physical acqui-
sition in both tools. This is because the h3lix jailbreak, the
tool available for devices running iOS 10, does not include
OpenSSH by default. OpenSSH is required in order to obtain
an acquisition in Magnet AXIOM. Cellebrite’s UFED4PC
also refused to obtain the acquisition. However, a manual
acquisition is possible, by simply manually browsing through
the phone’s filesystem. Important files are outlined in Section
IV, which can be found by manually acquiring the phone.
The Samsung Galaxy S7 was able to be acquired in Magnet
AXIOM. Magnet AXIOM recognizes the rooted status of
the device, and uses this to gain privileged access. Upon
completion, the full file system was decoded and available
for browsing. Cellebrite UFED4PC recognized the device as
rooted, but did not allow a physical acquisition. An Android
Debugging Bridge (ADB) physical acquisition was attempted,
but Cellebrite did not support the security level of the operating
system. Other devices, or other root methods, may be able to
be acquired successfully in Cellebrite UFED4PC.
IV. RESULTS
Upon analysis of the forensic images, artifacts of forensic
interest were found on all devices. A summary of whether an
artifact is available or not is depicted in Table I. iOS provided
access to the contact list in both applications, as well as a
large amount of other location data from Life360. Android
presented results largely the opposite, with most location data
recovered from the iSharing application. Upon jailbreaking
the iOS 10 device, a large amount of additional information,
including the user’s password in plaintext, was found in the
iSharing application folder. Upon rooting the Android device,
more location and messaging data was found from Life360’s
data folder.
A. iOS
Contact lists were found for both applications in iOS. These
contact lists can include the user’s name, email address, phone
number, and last seen coordinates. On Life360, this is found in
the L360Model.sqlite database within the ZL360Member table.
It is important to note this database includes the contacts’ full
names, email addresses, and phone number, as shown in IV-B.
On the iSharing application, this is found in the iSharing.db
database within the Person table. This table also lists accuracy
of the GPS measure as well as the last battery level recorded
for each user.
As mentioned in Section II, iOS uses the CoreLocation
framework to consolidate GPS information. CoreLocation’s
consolidated.db file was analyzed, and it was found to contain
marked locations for Life360. This could include locations the
user has deemed important, and the user has set the application
to provide notifications when other users enter or exit the area.
When a jailbroken iOS device was analyzed, additional
artifacts of significant forensic interest were found for the
iSharing application. The iSharing-Lite.plist file contains many
entries setting the configuration of the application. Of note, the
user’s username and password are stored in plaintext in this
file. In addition, the user’s defined home address is stored in
this file as well, as well as the registered phone number. This
file contains nearly every piece of the user’s profile.
B. Android
On Android, Life360 was well-protected on an unrooted
device, revealing only the user’s profile picture. This was
stored as a JPG file in the application directory. No user profile
information, nor any information about associated contacts,
was found for Life360 on Android. However, iSharing con-
tained many of the same artifacts found on the iOS version.
The isharing talk database contained many elements of the
user profiles, including name and GPS coordinates. The user
email was found in the ISHARING PREFS.xml file, which
contains the settings and configuration for the application.
Upon rooting the Android device, more artifacts were found
for Life360. The messaging.db database contained many user
interaction components. Life360 allows for messaging of other
contacts, and all messages were found in plaintext for this
application. The GPS location of where messages were sent
was found for some messages, particularly the automated
messages Life360 sends when someone arrives or leaves home.
For an example of this type of information in the database, see
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Based on the results presented, it was found that artifacts
of forensic importance could be located in both applications.
Digital forensics investigators may be able to recover GPS
information of both the user and the user’s contacts. The
amount of information available will depend on the operating
system and whether the full file system is available.
The first step an investigator should take when encountering
one of these applications is to determine the operating system
of the device. The investigator should then choose the most
appropriate acquisition method for the device. The specific
forensic tool should not have a large impact, as the results
found were the files existent on the device’s normal filesystem.
However, it is recommended to use a tool which can decode
TABLE II
IOS 12 ARTIFACT LOCATIONS
Artifact Type Application Location
Contact List iSharing iPhone/Applications/com.isharing.iSharing-Lite/Documents/isharing.db
Contact List Life360 iPhone/Applications/com.life360.safetymap/Library/Application Support/SafetyMap/L360Model.sqlite
Contact GPS Coordinates iSharing iPhone/Applications/com.isharing.iSharing-Lite/Documents/isharing.db
User GPS Coordinates Life360 iPhone/Applications/com.life360.safetymap/Documents/LogFile.txt
Remembered Locations Life360 iPhone/var/root/Library/Caches/locationd/consolidated.db
Remembered Locations Life360 iPhone/Applications/com.life360.safetymap/Library/Application Support/SafetyMap/L360Model.sqlite
TABLE III
IOS 10 (JAILBROKEN) ADDITIONAL ARTIFACT LOCATIONS (ALL LOCATIONS ARE UNDER DIRECTORY /PRIVATE/VAR/MOBILE)
Artifact Type Application Location
User Password iSharing /Containers/Data/Application/(application ID)/Library/Preferences/com.iSharing.iSharing-Lite.plist
User Phone Number iSharing /Containers/Data/Application/(applicaiton ID)/Library/Preferences/com.iSharing.iSharing-Lite.plist
User Home Address iSharing /Containers/Data/Application/(application ID)/Library/Preferences/com.iSharing.iSharing-Lite.plist
TABLE IV
ANDROID (UNROOTED) ARTIFACT LOCATIONS
Artifact Type Application Location
User Email iSharing Samsung GSM SM-G930U Galaxy S7.zip/apps/com.isharing.isharing/sp/ISHARING PREFS.xml
Contact List iSharing Samsung GSM SM-G930U Galaxy S7.zip/apps/com.isharing.isharing/db/isharing talk
Contact GPS Coordinates iSharing Samsung GSM SM-G930U Galaxy S7.zip/apps/com.isharing.isharing/db/isharing talk
User GPS Coordinates iSharing Samsung GSM SM-G930U Galaxy S7.zip/apps/com.isharing.isharing/db/com.hypertrack.common.device logs.db
Profile Pictures Life360 Samsung GSM SM-G930U Galaxy S7.zip/sdcard/Android/data/com.life360.android.safetymapd/cache
TABLE V
ANDROID (ROOTED) ADDITIONAL ARTIFACT LOCATIONS
Artifact Type Application Location
Messages and Associated Coordinates Life360 Samsung GSM SM-G930U Galaxy S7.zip/data/com.life360.android.safetymapd/databases/messaging.db
Fig. 1. Plaintext messages stored in messaging.db
and visually display databases, as many of the relevant artifacts
exist in a database file. If it is an iOS device, the investigator
should check for whether the device is jailbroken. If the device
is not jailbroken, the results in Table II are the most appropriate
places to look for evidence. If the device is jailbroken, one
should also check the locations in Table III. If the device is
an Android device, the results in Table IV should be examined.
If the device has been rooted, and the user is using Life360,
the results in Table V should be examined next.
A digital investigator should only access the level of data
they require before rooting or jailbreaking a phone. While
jailbreaking will result in additional artifacts, jailbreaking also
changes data permanently on an iOS device [20]. The same
is true for rooting on Android. While reversing a jailbreak or
root may be possible, all artifacts from the logical acquisition
should be considered first.
Fig. 2. User information stored in plaintext in Life360’s database
Of particular note was the presence of the user’s username
and password in plaintext found on the jailbroken iOS device.
These credentials would allow access to the entire application
and all associated data. This would allow digital investigators
to login to the application even if the image was a backup or
the phone had been restored.
The amount of information found overall supports the
research question. The data available could assist in solving
investigations related to kidnapping, missing persons, or orga-
nized criminal rings. It is possible to see who a user is asso-
ciated with as well as their last recorded location. Commonly
accessed locations and reminder locations are stored as well.
Finally, on Android, all messages sent between associated
users are viewable in plaintext. These are all artifacts which
can assist an investigator in a case where location data is vital.
This work also displays the importance of privacy and
security awareness among users of the applications. Users may
not realize their information is being stored locally on their
contacts’ phones, including their email address and last known
location. This could pose a risk of their information being
released if a phone is stolen or sold without first being erased.
In addition, the user password for iSharing application is not
securely stored since it can be recovered in plaintext.
Future work would include extending this work to other
common location sharing applications and testing on addi-
tional devices. Additional analysis could be done in regards to
the social media integration these applications provide in order
to discover if any social media artifacts are stored. This study
was limited to two iOS devices and one Android device; it
is possible additional devices may further validate the results
or find additional artifacts. Another possible research area
would involve looking at the paid, premium variants of these
applications. The premium versions advertise longer location
history, which may result in additional artifacts. This research
focused on the free, unpaid versions.
In summary, GPS artifacts can be found on both iOS
and Android devices when using the Life360 or iSharing
applications. These artifacts range from contact lists to GPS
coordinates and saved locations. On devices with access to the
full file system, more information can be recovered, such as
plaintext messages and possibly full account information. This
data can assist a law enforcement agency during the course
of a digital investigation if location of an individual or an
individual’s associates are important.
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